control

agent

execution

stop the next incident
● BLOCKEDspend.approve$47,300procurement-bot-v2No signed mandate2s ago|
● ALLOWEDinvoice.review$3,200ap-agent-1Policy: auto-approve <$5k8s ago|
● BLOCKEDpayment.initiate€12,840finance-agent-1Exceeded monthly limit14s ago|
● BLOCKEDcontract.renew$94,000ops-agent-v3Missing owner approval31s ago|
● ALLOWEDvendor.verify$1,800procurement-bot-v2Within mandate scope45s ago|
● BLOCKEDcard.issue$25,000expense-agentPolicy: CFO sign-off req.1m ago|
● ALLOWEDspend.approve$850ap-agent-2Auto-approved — logged1m ago|
● BLOCKEDwire.transfer$210,000treasury-botThreshold exceeded2m ago|
● BLOCKEDspend.approve$47,300procurement-bot-v2No signed mandate2s ago|
● ALLOWEDinvoice.review$3,200ap-agent-1Policy: auto-approve <$5k8s ago|
● BLOCKEDpayment.initiate€12,840finance-agent-1Exceeded monthly limit14s ago|
● BLOCKEDcontract.renew$94,000ops-agent-v3Missing owner approval31s ago|
● ALLOWEDvendor.verify$1,800procurement-bot-v2Within mandate scope45s ago|
● BLOCKEDcard.issue$25,000expense-agentPolicy: CFO sign-off req.1m ago|
● ALLOWEDspend.approve$850ap-agent-2Auto-approved — logged1m ago|
● BLOCKEDwire.transfer$210,000treasury-botThreshold exceeded2m ago|
SYS.ALERT
0x002

You are not scared of agents.
You are scared of letting them act.

— And you should be.

A chatbot that gives a bad answer is annoying. An agent that approves a supplier payment, issues a virtual card, renews a contract, or bypasses a spend rule is a control failure.

The question is not “Will we use agents?”

You will.

01

Who gave this agent the right to spend?

02

Under which mandate? With what limit?

03

And can we prove it?

answer these for your own stack
Where are you right now?

Every stage has a different exposure.

01

You are planning agents

Before your first workflow goes live, define what agents are allowed to do, who owns them, where they need approval and when they must be stopped.

02

You are testing agents

Pre-prod is where you find the dangerous gaps: vague scopes, missing owners, weak approval chains, unclear escalation, no proof trail.

03

You already have agents live

Then the question is brutal: can you reconstruct every sensitive action they took, why it was allowed, and who is accountable?

run the diagnostic for your situation5 questions — 3 min
The mandate protocol
0x004

SauronID gives agents a mandate before they act.

Not just identity. Not just logs. Not just monitoring after the fact.

Owner

Every agent tied to a human accountable for its actions

Intent

Declared purpose before any action is allowed to run

Policy

Business rules enforced at execution, not in audit

Spend limit

Hard caps by supplier, category, and workflow context

Approval path

Escalation chains defined before deployment, not after

Execution proof

Cryptographic evidence of what ran, when, and why

Audit trail

Reconstructable history any regulator or board can read

Kill switch

Instant revocation of any agent's mandate, any time

So your business can move faster — without pretending control exists when it does not.

request a deployment walkthrough
Exposure diagnostic

Can your agents be trusted with spend?

3 minutes. No bullshit. Answer based on your current agentic workflows.

Q.1 / 50%

Can every agent action be linked to a human or legal owner?

Request access

Do not wait for the first incident
to define control.

If agents are entering your finance, procurement or spend workflows, the control layer needs to exist before execution.